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We test how active management of bank credit risk exposure through the loan sales 
market affects capital structure, lending, profits, and risk.  We find that banks that 
rebalance their C&I loan portfolio exposures by both buying and selling loans – that is, 
banks that use the loan sales market for risk management purposes rather than to alter 
their holdings of loans -- hold less capital than other banks; they also make more risky 
loans (loans to businesses) as a percentage of total assets than other banks.  Holding size, 
leverage and lending activities constant, banks active in the loan sales market have lower 
risk and higher profits than other banks.  We conclude that increasingly sophisticated risk 
management practices in banking are likely to improve the availability of bank credit but 
not to reduce bank risk. 
 
 
   1
Risk Management, Capital Structure and Lending at Banks 
 
 
I.    Introduction 
 
It is difficult to imagine another sector of the economy where as many risks are 
managed jointly as in banking.  By its very nature, banking is an attempt to manage 
multiple and seemingly opposing needs.  Banks stand ready to provide liquidity on 
demand to depositors through the checking account and to extend credit as well as 
liquidity to their borrowers through lines of credit (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 1999).  
Because of these fundamental roles, banks have always been concerned with both 
solvency and liquidity.  Traditionally, banks held capital as a buffer against insolvency, 
and they held liquid assets – cash and securities – to guard against unexpected 
withdrawals by depositors or draw downs by borrowers (Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999). 
In recent years, risk management at banks has come under increasing scrutiny.  
Banks and bank consultants have attempted to sell sophisticated credit risk management 
systems that can account for borrower risk (e.g. rating), and, perhaps more important, the 
risk-reducing benefits of diversification across borrowers in a large portfolio.  Regulators 
have even begun to consider using banks’ internal credit models to devise capital 
adequacy standards. 
Why do banks bother?  In a Modigliani –Miller world, firms generally should not 
waste resources managing risks because shareholders can do so more efficiently by 
holding a well-diversified portfolio.  Banks (intermediaries) would not exist in such a 
world, however.  Financial market frictions such as moral hazard and adverse selection   2
problems require banks to invest in private information that makes bank loans illiquid 
(Diamond, 1984).  Because these loans are illiquid and thus costly to trade, and because 
bank failure itself is costly when their loans incorporate private information, banks have 
an incentive to avoid failure through a variety of means, including holding a capital 
buffer of sufficient size, holding enough liquid assets, and engaging in risk management.  
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998) present a rigorous 
theoretical analysis of how these frictions can affect non-financial firms’ investment as 
well as banks’ lending and risk-taking decisions.  According to their model, active risk 
management can allow banks to hold less capital and to invest more aggressively in risky 
and illiquid loans. 
In this paper, we test how access to the loan sales market affects bank capital 
structure and lending decisions.  Hedging activities in the form of derivatives trading and 
swap activities - activities that allow firms to manage their market risks - have been 
shown to influence firm performance and risk (e.g. Brewer, Minton, and Moser, 1999).  
Our approach is to test whether banks that are better able to trade credit risks in the loan 
sales market experience significant benefits.  We find clear evidence that they do.  In 
particular, banks that purchase and sell their loans – our proxy for banks that use the loan 
sales market to engage in credit-risk management – hold a lower level of capital per 
dollar of assets than banks not engaged in loan buying or selling.  Moreover, banks that 
are on both sides of the loan sales market also hold less capital than either banks that only 
sell loans but don’t buy them, or banks that only buy loans but don’t sell them.  This 
difference is important because it suggests that active rebalancing of credit risk – buying 
and selling rather than just selling (or buying) – allows banks to alter their capital   3
structure.  Our key results are therefore not driven by reverse causality whereby banks 
looking to increase their capital ratios go out and sell loans. 
We also find that banks that rebalance through loan sales and purchases hold 
lower levels of liquid assets (as a percentage of the whole balance sheet) relative to most 
other banks, although there is no statistically significant difference in the liquidity ratios 
between the buy-and-sell banks and the banks that just sell loans. 
Consistent with Froot and Stein (1998), we also find that credit risk management 
through active loan purchase and sales activity affects banks’ investments in risky loans.  
Banks that purchase and sell loans hold more risky loans (C&I loans and commercial real 
estate loans) as a percentage of the balance sheet than other banks.
1  Again, these results 
are especially striking because banks that manage their credit risk (buy and sell loans) 
hold more risky loans than banks that merely sell loans (but don’t buy them) or banks that 
merely buy loans (but don’t sell them). 
In our last set of results, we test whether loan sales activity leads to lower risk and 
higher returns on equity (ROE) and risk-adjusted returns on equity (RAROC).  We find 
that the buy-and-sell banks do display significantly lower risk (i.e. lower variability of 
loan losses and profits) and higher profit than banks doing similar activities but not using 
loan sales to manage their credit risk.  However, while risk-managing banks do have less 
risk and more profit than banks engaged in similar activities that do not manage credit 
risk via the loan sales market, the risk managing banks do not have lower risk than other 
banks unconditionally.  That is, when compared to banks overall, the buy-sell banks 
appear no safer and, perhaps, somewhat riskier; but when compared to their peers, banks 
                                                 
1 In an earlier draft, we also found that banks that buy and sell loans hold more risky loans as a fraction of 
the whole loan portfolio.   4
with similar operating and financial ratios, the buy-sell banks exhibit significantly lower 
risk.  Together with the results on capital structure and lending, these results suggest that 
banks use the risk-reducing benefits of risk management to take on more profitable, but 
higher risk, activities and to operate with greater financial leverage. 
Our results have implications not only for how banks manage their credit risk, but 
also for how regulators ought to view these efforts.  In particular, one of the aims of the 
recently proposed revisions to the 1988 Basel Capital Accord is to create incentives for 
banks to engage in more active and sophisticated risk management by offering a range of 
risk-based capital adequacy rules.  The proposal states that “For credit risk, this range [of 
capital adequacy rules] begins with the standardized approach and extends to the 
“foundation” and “advanced” internal-ratings based (IRB) approaches...  This 
evolutionary approach will motivate banks to continuously improve their risk 
management and measurement capabilities so as to avail themselves of the more risk-
sensitive methodologies and thus more accurate capital requirements” (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2001).  While we agree with the idea of creating incentives for 
banks to improve their risk management systems, our results suggest that regulators 
should not expect better risk management to lead to less risk.  Instead, our results suggest 
that banks that enhance their ability to manage credit risk will operate with greater 
leverage and will lend more of their assets to risky borrowers.  Thus, the benefits of 
advances in risk management in banking will likely be greater credit availability rather 
than reduced risk in the banking system. 
In the next section, we discuss previous studies of risk management and firm 
investment.  We then explain our empirical methods and results in Section III.  We   5
conclude in Section IV with implications for the likely effects of recent innovations in 
bank risk management for the availability of bank credit. 
II.  Risk Management, Capital Structure and Investment 
While a significant amount of work has gone into analyzing risk management in 
banking, the issues are not specific to financial institutions.  Non-financial firms also 
manage their risk exposures extensively, which in turn affects their investment decisions, 
profitability, and value.  Allayannis and Weston (1999), for example, examine the use of 
foreign currency derivatives in a sample of large U.S. non-financial firms and report that 
there is a positive relation between firm value and the use of foreign currency derivatives.  
Their evidence suggests that hedging raises firm value.  Minton and Schrand (1999) use a 
sample of non-financial firms in 37 industries and find that cash flow volatility leads to 
internal cash flow shortfalls, which in turn lead to higher costs of capital and forgone 
investments.  Firms able to minimize cash flow volatility seem to be able to invest more.   
In contrast to our work, extant studies of bank loan sales have not emphasized the 
links between risk management, capital structure and lending.  Recent papers have rather 
viewed loan sales as a response to regulatory costs (Benveniste and Berger, 1987), as a 
source of nonlocal bank capital to support local investments (Carlstrom and Samolyk 
1995, Pennacchi 1988), as a function of funding costs and risks (Gorton and Pennacchi, 
1995), and possibly as a way to diversify (Demsetz 1999).
2 
In a recent paper, Dahiya, Puri, and Saunders (2000) test whether loan sales 
announcements provide a negative signal about the prospects of the borrower whose loan 
is sold by a bank.   They also examine, in a small sample (19 institutions), the 
characteristics of loan sellers.  They find that stock prices fall at the announcement of a   6
loan sale and that many of the firms whose loans have been sold subsequently go 
bankrupt.  This evidence provides further support for the idea that banks hold private 
information about their borrowers that makes loan sales difficult due to adverse selection. 
Another strand of the banking literature emphasizes the link between the internal 
capital markets and bank lending.  For instance, Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) 
report that lending at banks owned by multi-bank bank holding companies (BHCs) is less 
subject to changes in cash flow and capital.  Jayaratne and Morgan (1999) find that shifts 
in deposit supply affects lending most at small, unaffiliated banks that do not have access 
to large internal capital markets.  Bank size also seems to allow banks to operate with less 
capital and, at the same time, engage in more lending.  Demsetz and Strahan (1997) show 
that larger BHCs manage to hold less capital and are able to pursue higher-risk activities, 
particularly C&I lending.  Ackavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) find that large banks 
following mergers tend to decrease their capital and increase their lending.  There also 
appears to be evidence that off-balance sheet activities in general and loan sales in 
particular help banking firms lower their capital levels to avoid regulatory taxes and 
improve their risk tolerance (Gorton and Haubrich 1990). 
One of the contributions of this paper is to go beyond the internal capital markets, 
as measured by both bank size and access to a multi-bank BHC, and test whether banks 
that use the loan sales market to manage credit risk alter their capital structure and 
lending decisions in a complementary way.  If banks with access to bigger internal capital 
markets (e.g. big banks and banks owned by multi-bank BHCs) hold less capital and lend 
more, then the same ought to be true for banks that use the external loan sales market to 
manage their credit risk.  We test this idea by estimating whether banks that buy and sell 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 For a review of the possible motives for loan sales, see Berger and Udell (1987).   7
loans hold less capital and engage in more risky lending than other banks, even after 
controlling for their size and holding company affiliation as proxies for the effectiveness 
and scope of the internal capital market.  Our empirical model can be viewed as a simple 
test of a model of risk management á la Froot and Stein in which hedging activities add 
value by allowing the bank to conserve on costly capital, and by ensuring that sufficient 
internal funds are available to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities. 
III.  Empirical Methods and Results  
A. Methods and Data 
Decision making in banking is not and should not be compartmentalized.  Actions 
that affect capital structure, investment decisions, and portfolio risks are not taken in 
isolation.  It is quite the norm that a single action or trading decision affects all of the 
above.  A bank loan is not purely an investment; this decision also affects risk-based 
capital requirements, as well as firm risk (through multiple layers of credit, interest rate 
and other risks).  Detailed loan-level data for a broad cross-section of banks is not 
available to the researcher.  Thus, one cannot observe how a particular loan decision 
affects the make-up of the overall portfolio or its risk and capital implications.  We are 
therefore left to infer implications from aggregate data and aggregate actions. 
  Our data come from the Reports of Income and Condition (the “Call  Report”) for 
all domestic commercial banks in the United States.  These data include the sale and 
purchase of all loans originated by the bank, excluding residential real estate and 
consumer loans.  If a bank were involved in a syndicated loan and sold its portion of the 
syndication, this would be counted as a loan sale as well.  The data also include only 
those loans sold or purchased without recourse, meaning that the risk of the loan must   8
have left the balance sheet of the selling bank to be counted.  Data on both loan purchases 
and sales are available quarterly from June of 1987 through the end of 1993.  We use 
these figure to compute annual flows of loans sold and purchased from June to June in 
each year from 1988 to 1993.   So, for example, the 1988 loan sales figures reflect loans 
sold between June of 1987 and June of 1988.  In this example, we would then assign 
these flows to the balance sheet figures as of June of 1988. 
As noted above, our purpose is to test how active management of credit risk, as 
proxied by loan sales and purchases, affects a financial institution's capital structure, 
lending, profits, and risk.  We estimate a series of cross-sectional, reduced form 
regressions that relate measures of capital structure, investments in risky loans, profits 
and risk to control variables (designed to capture the extent of a bank’s access to an 
internal capital market) to measures of the bank’s use of the loan sales market to foster 
risk management.   Our dependent variables are the following:   
Capital and Liquidity Variables 
Capital/Assets ratio = Book value of equity / Assets 
Liquidity ratio = Cash + Federal Funds Sold + Securities / Assets  
Lending Variables 
Commercial & Industrial Loans / Assets 
Commercial Real Estate Loans / Assets 
Risk Variables 
  Time-series standard deviation of each bank’s ROE (Earnings/Capital) 
Time-series standard deviation of each banks’s Loan Loss 
Provisions/Total Loans   9
Profit Variables 
    Time-series mean of each bank’s ROE 
 
RAROC = Time-series mean ROE / time-series standard deviation of 
bank’s ROE. 
To capture the effect of internal capital markets (Jayaratne and Morgan 1999, 
Demsetz and Strahan 1997, Houston, James and Marcus 1997), we include as regressors 
indicator variables for banks owned by multi-bank holding companies and multi-state 
bank holding companies.  We also create indicators to capture the effect of firm size 
based on the bank’s total assets.  Following Demsetz (1999), we avoid imposing a linear 
(or log-linear) relationship between size and our dependent variables.  Instead, we include 
indicators for eight asset classes, with firms in asset size greater than $10 billion acting as 
the omitted category.
3 
We need to be careful to isolate risk management activities in the loan sales 
market from other reasons why banks might buy or sell loans.  For instance, banks may 
sell (buy) in response to relatively strong (weak) loan demand conditions.  Similarly, 
unusually strong funding conditions may induce loan purchase activity, while unusually 
weak funding conditions may induce loan sales.  Again following Demsetz (1999), we 
create three indicator variables to reflect a bank’s activities in the loan sales market: these 
variables denote whether a bank only sells loans, whether it only buys loans, or whether it 
buys and sells loans; firms that do not participate at all act as the omitted category in the 
regressions.  We focus our attention on banks that both buy and sell loans, since demand 
                                                 
3 We have also estimated our models with an indicator equal to one for banks that hold interest rate 
derivatives contracts (mainly plain-vanilla swaps) as a proxy for banks that manage market risk.  This 
indicator variable is positively related to the C&I loans to assets ratio but not related to bank capital   10
and funding conditions are unlikely to be driving the results for these banks. Our theory 
suggests that banks that engage more actively in risk management in this way will be able 
to conserve capital and operate with fewer liquid assets, and at the same time, they will 
be able to take advantage of more risky lending opportunities without unduly increasing 
their credit risk.
4 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the full sample for each of the 
variables in the models.  The sample starts with 74,045 bank/year observations.  (For the 
risk and profit variables, which are computed from time-series statistics for each bank, 
we have just a single observation per bank.)  We then lose some observations due to 
missing data or obviously incorrect data.  For example, we dropped observations where 
the balance sheet ratios exceeded one.  In addition, the ratio of earnings to capital (ROE) 
has large positive and negative outliers.  We therefore trim this variable at the 1
st and 99
th 
percentile of its distribution before constructing mean ROE and RAROC for each bank.  
Similarly, we trim the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans at the 1
st and 99
th 
percentiles.  We then trim the two risk measures, the standard deviation of ROE and the 
standard deviation of the loan loss provisions to loans ratio, at their respective 1
st and 99
th 
percentiles.  We do the same for RAROC. 
We also report mean characteristics in Table 1 for banks that buy loans, sell loans, 
buy and sell loans, or do neither.  These simple comparisons suggest that banks that buy 
and sell loans have the lowest capital-to-assets and liquid assets ratios and the highest 
                                                                                                                                                 
structure variables or commercial real estate lending.  Its inclusion in the model does not change the other 
results that we focus on below. 
4 In a second set of specifications, we have also replaced the indicator variables with the ratio of gross sales 
(sales + purchases) of loans to total C&I loans, and the ratio of net purchases (purchases - sales) of loans to 
total C&I loans.  The net purchases variable controls for loan demand effects (low loan demand leading to 
net purchases) or funding supply effects (high supply of funding leading to net purchases).  The gross loan   11
levels of risky loans as a percentage of the balance sheet.
5  On its face, these comparisons 
support the idea that active risk management via the external loan sales market adds value 
to banks by allowing them to conserve on capital and liquid assets and engage more in 
the activity that generates value – risky lending.  Of course, the banks that buy and sell 
loans are also larger and more likely to affiliate with multi-bank and multi-state bank 
holding companies than the other banks.  Thus, these banks also seem to have access to a 
better (or at least bigger) internal capital market.  We now control for this effect in our 
regressions. 
B.  Loan Sales, Capital Structure and Lending Choices 
  Table 2 reports our regression results for the capital-to-assets ratio.  Both BHC 
affiliation and increasing bank size seem to be associated with lower capital-asset ratios, 
suggesting that larger internal capital markets do allow banks to operate with a smaller 
cushion against insolvency.  In contrast, and somewhat to our surprise, however, banks 
affiliated with multi-state BHCs do not seem to hold less capital. 
Our proxy for a bank’s use of loan sales activity to manage risk suggests very 
strongly that banks can conserve on capital by actively managing their credit risk through 
loan sales.  The buy-and-sell variables are negative and significant (both economically 
and statistically) in all years; they suggest that banks that manage their credit risk by both 
buying and selling loans have capital-asset ratios 1.2 to 1.5 percentage points lower than 
banks that do not participate at all in this market.  Perhaps more important, the banks that 
                                                                                                                                                 
sales ratio measures how aggressively a bank manages or rebalances its loan portfolio.  These results are 
largely consistent with those reported using the indicator specifications. 
5 The simple comparison between buy-sell, buy only, sell only and buy-sell banks are not available for the 
risk and profit variables since these are constructed as time-series averages for each bank.  We also 
averaged our indicator variables for our risk and profit regressions over time, i.e. a bank that sold only in 2 
of the 6 years will have a sell only value of 2/6.   Demsetz (2000) shows that most banks remain in the 
same loan sales category from year to year, but some will switch categories in time.   12
appear to rebalance their risk through both purchase and sale have capital-asset ratios 
about 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points lower than banks that just sell loans, and this difference 
is statistically significant at the one percent level in all six years. 
  The results for liquid assets (the cash + securities-to-assets ratio) provide further 
support to our expectation that firms that engage in loan trading can afford to reduce their 
buffer of liquid assets.  Once again, as shown in Table 3, control variables perform as 
expected -- large banks affiliated with BHCs (especially multi-state BHCs) hold fewer 
liquid assets.  Moreover, we again find that banks that both buy and sell loans hold lower 
levels of liquid assets than either banks that neither buy nor sell, or banks that only buy 
loans.  We find no statistically meaningful differences in liquidity ratios, however, for the 
buy-and-sell banks and the sell-only banks. 
Overall, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that risk management via the loan sales market 
affects banks’ capital structure and liquidity choices.  In Tables 4 and 5, we show that 
credit risk management through loan purchase and sales activity also affects lending 
decisions -- banks that use the loan sales market to manage credit risk invest a greater 
fraction of their assets in risky loans.  In Table 4, we examine the ratio of C&I loans to 
assets, and in Table 5 we examine the ratio of commercial real estate loans to total assets.  
The results, after controlling for size and BHC affiliation, provide further support for our 
hypothesis. 
Looking first at Table 4 (C&I loans per dollar of assets), we find that, at a 
minimum, C&I loans-to-assets are 2.8 percentage points higher, on average, at banks that 
buy and sell loans compared to banks that do not participate in the loan sales market.  
Moreover, the buy-and-sell banks hold C&I loans-to-assets ratio 1.6 to 4.2 percentage   13
points higher than the banks that buy only, and 0.2 to 1.9 percentage points higher than 
banks that sell only.  The difference in C&I lending for the buy-sell banks and the sell-
only banks is statistically significant in five of the six years. 
For commercial real estate lending, the pattern is similar.  Relative to banks not 
involved in the loan sales market, commercial real estate loans per dollar of assets are at 
least 2.8 percentage points higher at the buy-sell banks.  Compared with the buy-only 
banks, the buy-and-sell banks hold 1.5 to 2.7 percentage points more commercial real 
estate loans, and compared with the sell-only banks, they hold 0.3 to 1.1 percentage 
points more commercial real estate loans.  The difference in commercial real estate 
lending between the buy-sell and sell-only banks is statistically significant at the one 
percent level in four of the six years, and at the 10 percent level in one of the six years. 
  The results to this point establish a strong and consistent correlation between 
capital, liquidity, risky lending and banks’ activity in the loan sales market for credit risk 
management.  These correlations suggest that banks that engage in risk management alter 
their financial and operating strategies toward ones that would, on their own, increase 
risk.  As is always the case, however, it is difficult to rule out reverse causality.  Perhaps 
banks with higher risk (e.g. banks with less capital or banks with higher levels of risky 
loans) choose to institute a more active risk management program to offset (or partially 
offset) their greater financial and operating risk, rather than the other way around. 
To rule out reverse causality, we replace the three loan sales indicators reported in 
the regressions of Tables 2-5, with a single variable intended to capture the extent of loan 
sales activities by other banks headquartered in the same local market, defined as a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  (For banks not headquartered in an MSA, we use   14
the county as the local market.)  The idea is to replace variables that reflect a bank’s 
choice of whether or not to manage risk via the loan sales market (the three loan sales 
indicator variables) with a variable that captures the cost of using the loan sales market 
for this purpose.  The premise is that a bank is more likely to face a low cost of using the 
loan sales market for risk management if other banks in the same local area do so.  This 
lower cost, for example, could reflect the nature of the borrowers or industries located 
near the bank.
6 
As a measure of banks’ use of the loan sales market – call it the “depth” of the 
local loan sales market – we compute the sum of all loans made by banks headquartered 
in the same MSA (or non-MSA county) that both buy and sell loans, divided by all loans 
made by all banks in the MSA.  This variable ranges from a low of zero (no other bank in 
the market is a buy-sell bank) to one (all other banks in the local market are buy-sell 
banks). We do not include lending by the bank in question in constructing local loan sales 
depth because we want our measure of loan sales activity to be insensitive to the actual 
choices made by the bank.  Thus, the results are unlikely to be driven by reverse 
causality. 
Before testing how a bank’s capital, liquidity and lending depend on local loan 
market depth, we first note that this variable exhibits a high correlation with the buy-sell 
indicator variable.  Thus, we seem to have identified a good instrument; if a bank is 
located in a market where many of its competitors actively use the loan sales market, then 
                                                 
6 Survey evidence suggests that firms (as well as households) tend to borrow from banks that are 
geographically close.   15
the bank does too.
7  For example, in year-by-year cross sectional regressions similar to 
those in Tables 2-5 with the buy-sell indicator as the dependent variable and the size 
indicators, the multi-bank and multi-state BHC indicators and our measure of local loan 
market depth as explanatory variables, the coefficient on the market depth variable ranges 
from 0.17 to 0.20 with a t-statistic that never falls below 14.   
Table 6 reports the results.  To preserve space, we only report the coefficients on 
our measure of the depth of the local loan sales market.  For all four variables and for all 
six years, the coefficients are large and statistically significant.  First, we find that banks 
hold less capital per dollar of asset if they are located in markets with many active loan 
sellers and buyers.  For example, a bank in a market where none of its competitors act as 
both a loan buyer and seller has, on average, a capital-asset ratio 0.3 to 0.6 percentage 
points higher than a similar bank located in a market where all of its competitors use the 
loan sales market for risk management.  Second, a bank in a market where none of its 
competitors act as both a loan buyer and seller has, on average, a liquid assets-to-total 
assets ratio 2.2 to 4.1 percentage points higher than a similar bank located in a market 
where all of its competitors use the loan sales market.  The same story holds for lending.  
Banks in markets where competitors use the loan sales market as both buyers and sellers 
hold 2.0 to 4.6 percent more C&I loans per dollar of assets and 1.7 to 3.2 percent more 
commercial real estate loans per dollar of assets.
8 
                                                 
7 Note that we cannot re-estimate the models of Tables 2-5 using an instrumental variables procedure 
because the model is not identified.  We have three endogenous variables – the three loan sales indicators – 
but just a single instrument.  Thus, we report what could be interpreted as a reduced form instead. 
8 This analysis may raise the concern that our results have only to do with differences in bank behavior that 
reflect difference across local markets.  For example, one interpretation of these findings is that they reflect 
an unobservable characteristic of the loans that makes them both safer and, thus, easier to sell.  To rule this 
out, we have estimated our model with MSA-level (or non-MSA county-level) fixed effects on the 
assumption that banks tend to lend to local firms, and that loans to firms in the same MSA are   16
C.  Loan Sales Activity, Risk, and Profits 
In our last set of results, we estimate the relationship between loan sales activity 
and two measures of risk, the standard deviation of a bank’s return on equity and the 
standard deviation of a bank’s loan loss provisions to total loans.  These standard 
deviations reflect the time series variability in the two ratios, one reflecting a bank’s 
overall profitability and the other reflecting the losses realized on its loan portfolio.  We 
then test whether profit (mean ROE) and risk-adjusted profit (the ratio of a bank’s mean 
ROE to the standard deviation ROE, what we call “RAROC”) is higher at banks engaged 
in loan sales and purchases than at other banks.
9  Because the risk and profit measures are 
based on time-series data for each bank, we only estimate a single cross-sectional model.  
We thus report the “between” estimator, which exploits the full panel dataset but 
estimates the regression using the time-series averages of both the dependent and 
explanatory variables for each bank.  This estimator depends on variation between banks, 
so it is analogous to the earlier annual cross sectional results.
10 
As reported in Table 7, there is a strong relationship between activity in the loan 
sales market and the two risk measures, although the effects depend on whether or not we 
control for capital structure and lending activities.  Without controls for activities, banks 
that buy and sell loans appear to have higher volatility of ROE than banks not engaged at 
all in the loan sales market, or banks that only buy loans (column 1).  However, 
                                                                                                                                                 
homogeneous.  In these models we continue to find that the buy-sell banks have statistically significantly 
lower capital ratios and higher ratios of risky loans to assets than the other banks. 
9  This analysis is similar in spirit to Demsetz and Strahan (1997), who link stock return volatility to bank 
characteristics.  Here, we use accounting measures of risk rather than market measures of risk because we 
need to include the smaller banks without publicly traded stock to have sufficient variation in our loan sales 
variables. 
10 In principle, we could estimate the relationship between ROE and loan sales activity on a year-by-year 
basis, as we do with the balance sheet ratios.  However, since ROE tends to fluctuate over time, we decided 
to report the relationship based on average profits over our sample period.   17
controlling for activities, the buy-and-sell banks are safer than otherwise similar banks 
(i.e. banks with similar capital structures and loan portfolios) that do not avail themselves 
of the opportunity to manage risks through the external markets (column 2).  For 
example, the volatility of ROE is about 0.006 lower for the buy-sell banks than for banks 
outside the loan sales market entirely.  Relative to the sell-only banks, ROE volatility is 
about 0.004 lower for the buy-sell banks; both of these differences are statistically 
significant at the one percent level.  These differences are also economically significant, 
representing a decline in the volatility of ROE equal to more than 10 percent of its 
unconditional mean (0.032—see Table 1).  Comparing the buy-sell and buy only banks, 
we also find that buy-sell banks have lower volatility of ROE, but the difference is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Table 7 displays a similar pattern for loan loss volatility.  Unconditionally, the 
buy-sell banks have loan loss volatility that is not significantly different from that 
displayed by banks not engaged at all in the loans sales market and banks that only buy 
loans (column 3).  Controlling for activities, however, the buy-sell banks have 
considerably lower loan loss volatility than the other three sets of banks (column 4).  For 
example, the buy-sell banks have loan loss volatility about 0.0005 lower than banks not 
engaged at all in loan sales, and they have loan loss volatility that is 0.0003 lower than 
the sell-only banks, or about 15 percent of the mean volatility of loan losses (Table 1).  
Both of these differences are statistically significant at the one percent level.  Compared 
with the buy-only banks, we find that loan loss volatility is 0.0002 lower for the buy-sell 
banks, and this difference is statistically significant at the five percent level (p-
value=0.03).   18
As a final test of our hypotheses, we want to estimate how bank profit varies with 
risk management activities in the loan sales market.  Our sample period, however, covers 
a time of turmoil in the U.S. banking industry in which loans to businesses experienced 
very poor performance.  Because the banks active in loan sales held more of these loans 
(see above), and because these loans turned out to experience losses, the relationship 
between ex-post profits and loan sales activity would be obscured during our sample 
period in the absence of controls for activities.  We therefore account for the very poor 
ex-post performance of banks’ lending to businesses during this period in our regressions 
to remove this bias by including the capital structure and lending activity variables 
analyzed in Tables 2-5 in our last set of regressions. 
In Table 8 we report the relationship between loan sales and bank profits (ROE) 
and risk-adjusted profits (RAROC).  We find that the banks that use loan sales to manage 
credit risks – the banks that both buy and sell loans – have significantly higher ROE and 
risk-adjusted profits (RAROC) than all three other groups of banks.  Relative to banks 
that do not engage in loans sales, for example, the buy-sell banks have an average ROE 
that is 0.9 percentage points higher, and relative to the sell-only banks, the buy-and-sell 
banks experienced an average ROE that is 0.7 percentage points higher.  Similarly, the 
buy-and-sell banks display higher risk-adjusted profits than banks in the other three 
groups. 
Banks that manage their risks by both buying and selling loans appear to benefit.  
They can operate with less capital and hold fewer liquid assets on their balance sheet, and 
they can engage in more risky lending – lending to business – rather than safe lending 
(consumer and residential real estate), all without unduly increasing their risk.  These   19
strategies raise profits.  What explains the banks that don’t manage their risks through the 
loan sales market?  One possibility is that loans with private information are hard to sell 
at arm’s length unless a bank has established a strong reputation over time in this market.  
In fact, the recent results by Dahiya, Puri, and Saunders are consistent with this view. 
Alternatively, during our sample period there may be mainly poorly managed banks that 
have been able to persist in the U.S. due to regulations that reduce competitive pressures 
and government subsidies (see Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998 and Berger, Kashyap and 
Scalise, 1995). 
Trends toward more widespread adoption of risk management techniques support 
our finding that banks benefit by using these techniques to increase profit.  During the 
past few years, sophisticated banks and financial consultants have begun successfully 
marketing risk management software to banks.  JP Morgan, for example, developed its 
Creditmetrics model to allow banks to estimate how diversification across rating 
categories, industries, and countries affect the overall loss distribution for their portfolio.  
Our study focuses on banks’ uses of the loan sales market for risk management during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s because of data availability, but we would expect other risk 
management techniques that have been adopted over the past several years to have had 
similar effects on bank capital structure, lending and profits.  Rigorous testing of the 
effects of these new risk management techniques, however, will have to wait for more 
time to pass and more data to be collected. 
IV. Conclusions 
We have long been intrigued by the mechanisms through which banks seem to 
cater to many and opposing needs.  Liquidity, profitability, and solvency goals seem to   20
cross paths and by and large contradict one another.  The extant empirical literature for 
non-financial firms indicates that active risk management through both internal capital 
markets (e.g. scale and diversification) and through active engagement in the external 
capital markets (e.g. active use of derivatives) provide ways to manage liquidity and cash 
flow and achieve higher investment. 
We have considered the case of the loan sales market as one tool (that we can 
measure empirically) which banks use to align their risk management, lending and capital 
structure goals.  The focus in the banking literature has been on how banks use their 
internal capital markets.  Our results support these studies, since we find that bigger 
banks affiliated with multi-bank BHCs enjoy lower capital ratios and higher lending.  We 
extend these results by showing that access to and aggressive use of an external loan sales 
market to manage credit risk leads to the same effects.  Loan sales activity allows a bank 
to hold less capital, invest less in low-yield, high-liquidity assets, while at the same time 
increase its holdings of higher-risk, higher-return assets.  The relationship between risk 
and loan sales activity suggests that these moves toward higher risk activities do not, in 
fact, result in higher risk.  It seems that the risk-reducing benefits of engagement in the 
loan sales market are, in effect, spent by banks on higher risk activities.  The motivation 
for these changes in capital structure and lending practices is profit -- we find that profits 
are higher at banks that buy and sell loans. 
We conclude that the banks that engage in both buying and selling of loans are 
better able to take advantage of positive net-present-value investment opportunities, as 
they are able to increase their C&I and commercial real estate loans and are better able to 
manage with less liquidity and less capital.  The buying and selling of loans at the same   21
time seems to allow banks to be more flexible and more aggressive.  The flexibility 
reduces the burden of carrying more capital, and lower yield higher liquidity assets; and 
the aggressiveness allows them to increase their higher risk and higher yield assets. 
In recent years we have seen banks trade credit risks using credit derivatives, and 
we have seen the emergence of sophisticated credit risk measurement systems that take 
account of correlations across borrowers in different industries, countries and market 
segments.  Regulators have decided that such innovations ought to be encouraged and 
even used to help determine capital adequacy standards.  Our look at how banks have 
used the loan sales market suggests that developments in risk management are healthy 
ones that are likely to increase the availability of bank credit, but we caution that 
regulators ought not expect that these technologies will be employed to reduce risk.   22
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics   
   
 





























Capital / Assets 
 
72,611  0.091  0.034  0.092  0.089  0.083  0.100 
Securities / Assets 
 
74,043  0.429  0.163  0.466  0.402  0.392  0.474 
C&I Loans / Assets 
 
73,938  0.105  0.094  0.093  0.111  0.126  0.078 
CRE / Assets 
 
74,044  0.088  0.083  0.082  0.095  0.104  0.067 
Total Assets 
  (Millions of $s) 
74,045  269  2,599  116  137  530  99 
In a Multi-bank Holding 
Company? 
74,045  0.314  -  0.351  0.215  0.477  0.166 
In a Multi-state Holding 
Company? 
74,045  0.122  -  0.113  0.090  0.178  0.078 
Std. Dev. of return on 
equity (ROE) 
12,670  0.032  0.029  -  -  -  - 
Std. Dev. of Loan Loss 
Provisions/Total Loans 
12,732  0.002  0.003  -  -  -  - 
Average ROE  13,896  0.053  0.051  -  -  -  - 
RAROC (Avg. ROE / Std. 
Dev. of ROE) 
12,672  3.695  3.307  -  -  -  - 
Buy loans? 
 
73,033  0.119  -  1  0  0  0 
Sell  loans? 
 
73,033  0.188  -  0  1  0  0 
Buy and sell loans? 
 
73,033  0.378  -  0  0  1  0 
 
   25
Table 2 
Dependent Variable: Capital to Asset Ratio   
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 

































































































































































































































P-value for F-Test that 
Sell=Buy and Sell 




0.131  0.125  0.111  0.101  0.089  0.083 
N  12,893  12,445  12,147  11,813  11,483  11,066 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported below coefficients in parentheses (See White, 1980).  **Significant at the 
1% level  *Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that 
neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted category for the sell and buy indicator variables.   26
Table 3 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Cash Plus Securities to Assets   
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 

































































































































































































































P-value for F-Test that 
Sell=Buy and Sell 




0.126  0.126  0.129  0.112  0.096  0.095 
N  13,165  12,722  12,348  12,009  11,617  11,170 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported below coefficients in parentheses (See White, 1980).   **Significant at the 
1% level  *Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that 
neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted category for the sell and buy indicator variables.   27
Table 4 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of C&I Loans to Assets   
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 

































































































































































































































P-value for F-Test that 
Sell=Buy and Sell 




0.091  0.094  0.087  0.082  0.081  0.063 
N  13,149  12,706  12,341  12,003  11,612  11,165 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported below coefficients in parentheses (See White, 1980).   **Significant at the 
1% level  *Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that 
neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted category for the sell and buy indicator variables.   28
Table 5 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Commercial Real Estate Loans to Assets   
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 






























































































































































































































P-value for F-Test that 
Sell=Buy and Sell 




0.149  0.147  0.152  0.145  0.134  0.131 
N  13,165  12,722  12,348  12,009  11,618  11,170 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported below coefficients in parentheses (See White, 1980).   **Significant at the 
1% level  *Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that 
neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted category for the sell and buy indicator variables.   29
Table 6 
The Relationship between Capital, Liquidity and Bank Lending to the Depth of 
Local Loan Sales Market   
Dependent Variable  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 












































Commercial Real Estate 















             
Each cell in this table represents the coefficient estimate from one variable in a multiple regression (i.e. there are 24 regression 
equations represented here).  The dependent variables in each regression are the same as those reported in Tables 2-5.  All of the bank 
characteristics (except the loan sales variables) are also the same as those reported in Tables 2-5, but these are not reported to conserve 
space.   The coefficient on our measure of the depth of the local loan sales market, defined as the amount of lending done by banks 
that both buy and sell loans as a fraction of all lending done in the same local market as the bank, is reported here, along with its 
standard error.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported below coefficients in parentheses (See White, 1980). 
**Significant at the 1% level  *Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator 
variables.  Banks that neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted category for the sell and buy indicator variables.   30
Table 7 
Dependent Variables: Volatility of Return on Equity, Volatility of Loan Loss 
Provisions to Total Loans 
   
Volatility of Return on Equity  
Volatility of Loan Loss Provisions to 
Total Loans  
  No controls  With controls  No controls  With controls 








Capital to Asset Ratio 
 
-  -0.295** 
(0.009) 
-  -0.0098** 
(0.0008) 
Securities to Assets 
 
-  -0.001 
(0.002) 
-  0.0008** 
(0.0002) 
C&I Loans to Assets 
 
-  0.064** 
(0.004) 
-  0.0051** 
(0.0003) 
Commercial Real Estate to Assets  -  0.056** 
(0.004) 
-  0.0023** 
(0.0003) 






















































































































P-value for F-Test that Sell=Buy 
and Sell 
0.05  <0.01  0.02  <0.01 
P-value for F-Test that Buy=Buy 
and Sell 




0.020  0.167  0.018  0.053 
N  12,670  12,598  12,732  12,712 
This table estimates the relationship between the average volatility of ROE and loan losses for each bank on the average value of its 
balance sheet characteristics and loan sales indicator variables.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported below 
coefficients in parentheses (See White, 1980).  **Significant at the 1% level  *  Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion 
is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted category for the sell 
and buy indicator variables.   31
 Table 8 
Dependent Variables:  Mean Return on Equity (ROE) and RAROC (Mean 
ROE/Volatility of ROE) 
 
  Return Regressions 






































































































0.109  0.120 
N  13,766  12,598 
This table estimates the relationship between the average volatility of ROE and loan losses for each bank, average ROE and RAROC 
on the average value of its balance sheet characteristics and loan sales indicator variables.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors are reported below coefficients in parentheses (See White, 1980).  **Significant at the 1% level  *Significant at the 5% level .  
Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that neither buy nor sell loans constitute the 
omitted category for the sell and buy indicator variables. 
  